Ten years ago, observers warned that foreign direct investment in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) would be stymied by the problem of environmental liability for past pollution. CEE governments responded by granting some investors exemptions from liability for past pollution. Nevertheless, during the 1990s, many investors steered away from contaminated properties, opting to construct new facilities in more pristine areas. Increasingly, in Western Europe and the United States, governments view liability for past pollution as one aspect of the broader problem of attracting wary investors to old, industrial properties or "brownfields." CEE governments can gain by considering the applicability of Western-style brownfields revitalization policies and programs to the CEE context. CEE governments can adapt legal and regulatory aspects of brownfields cleanup programs. But, the financial demands of brownfields cleanup are insurmountable in CEE without stepped-up economic assistance from external actors.

Adecadehaselapsedsincethefirstwaveofgrimreportsreachedthe
West about the public health and environmental crises wrought by four decades of economic mismanagement in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Much has been written about the environmental devastation perpetrated by Communist governments in CEE and about CEE countries' efforts to repair the damage (Ackerman, 1991; Hughes & Lovei, 1999 ; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 1998b; Schreiber, 1991) . Near the end of the Cold War and shortly thereafter, many observers warned about the specter of past environmental liability in CEE, that is, the challenge of assigning responsibility for remediating damages from Soviet-era pollution (Maremont, Kapstein, & Schares, 1990, pp. 114-115; Scherer, 1992, pp. 3-4 ; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994, p. 17) . Although scholarly and journalistic interest in this topic has diminished, the problem itself has not gone away. None of the CEE countries were as expeditious in resolving the problem of environmental liability as Germany after reunification. The exemption clause in the German Unification Treaty allowed purchasers of old, contaminated properties to seek exemptions from liability for contami-the absence of domestic private investment, actors outside the region are the most promising sources to underwrite the cleanup of past pollution.
A paradox for CEE governments is that foreign investors are unlikely to invest in contaminated sites in CEE unless governments add value to these investments. In many European Union (EU) countries and in the United States, governments have gradually recognized that cleaning up old, contaminated industrial sites ("brownfields") requires governmental leadership. In these countries, new, investor-friendly liability schemes encourage revitalization of brownfields. But, just as new rules governing liability are only one ingredient in brownfields cleanup in advanced industrialized nations, such schemes represent a necessary but insufficient guarantor of cleanup in CEE.
This article considers CEE countries' efforts to clarify rules and procedures governing liability for past pollution and how these reforms affect incentives for foreign direct investment in the region. We also elucidate a second key link between past contamination and foreign investment in CEE, namely, that for the foreseeable future, foreign investors are essential actors in the cleanup of this type of contamination.
The geographical scope of this article extends no farther east than the Baltic states, Romania, and Bulgaria. European regions of the New Independent States deserve a separate analysis because of the scale of the environmental damages there and that region's relatively divergent political and socioeconomic conditions compared with CEE countries. Case material in this article attends mostly to the policy-making experiences of the wealthiest countries in the region, namely, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.
We find that despite CEE governmental efforts to allay foreign investors' concerns about environmental liability, the problem of cleaning up past pollution in CEE persists, with negative consequences for foreign investors, governments struggling to privatize and clean up contaminated properties, and citizens of CEE nations who live amid contaminated sites. An enduring puzzle for CEE governments is how to appeal to foreign investors who are reluctant to purchase old, primarily state-owned industrial properties in CEE. These governments are capable of instituting more flexible requirements governing future uses and cleanup of contaminated properties. Authorities can also adapt various economic incentives to lure foreign investors. However, in the short run, CEE governments are unlikely to satisfy the public financing provisions of Western-style brownfields revitalization programs or to cultivate public awareness of and participation in policies and programs to clean up, recycle, and reuse contaminated industrial properties.
The next section of this article defines the importance of FDI to the CEE region, including its role in environmental remediation. Different environmental liability assignments and their implications for FDI and pollution cleanup in CEE are addressed in the third section. We consider Poland's efforts to allay foreign investors' concerns about environmental liability for past contamination in detail, because Poland's experiences offer lessons for other countries in the region. Finally, this article considers the merits of a more elaborate legal and economic prescription for environmental cleanup in CEE, one that includes but is not confined to clarifying the rights and obligations of new owners who inherit past contamination problems. These incentive-based environmental cleanup and redevelopment schemes are increasingly common in the West, but the relevant scholarly literature has not explored their adaptability to the CEE context.
Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Eastern Europe
Drafting and implementing practicable environmental laws and regulations, stepped-up environmental enforcement efforts, and stable economic growth are ingredients in the cleanup of Communist-era environmental problems in CEE and are means for managing future environmental problems. Supporting roles in the region's environmental rehabilitation are performed by injections of capital, new technologies, and the business acumen of foreign investors. FDI involves partial or complete ownership of and control over the assets of a firm in one country by a parent firm in another country. The environmental advantages derived from FDI are often second-order outcomes. In CEE, for example, the main environmental benefits from the approximately U.S. $5 to U.S. $10 billion of annual FDI flowing to that region are reduced emissions and greater energy efficiencies wrought by new capital equipment and foreign investors' specialization in relatively environmentally benign service industries. Foreigners who invest in CEE also bring modern pollution management techniques and, in many instances, environmental habits shaped by years of abiding by the environmental rules and regulations of industrialized democracies (Goldenman, 1999, p. 75) .
Beyond its environmental benefits, FDI provides host countries with capital, new technology, modern production techniques, new products, management skills, employment opportunities, and entrée to world markets (McMillan, 1995, pp. 138-141) . Some observers also believe that FDI stimulates economic growth, perhaps via technological spillover (Blomström, Lipsey, & Zejan, 1992) .
Not all experts agree that FDI is beneficial for developing and transitional economies. For example, it is claimed that the increasing economic power of multinational corporations (MNCs) that sponsor FDI runs counter to public interests (Jenkins, 1996, p. 444; Lall, 1974, p. 44) . Critics contend that the alleged benefits of FDI are temporary because by repatriating profits, MNCs remove badly needed investment capital from developing countries (Baran, 1973, p. 325; Lall, 1974, p. 44; Nafziger, 1997, p. 452) . Others urge that MNCs tend to employ capital-intensive production techniques, making labor dispensable. Also, some contend that international private capital distorts developing countries' economic development by absorbing local savings and entrepreneurial talent that could be used in other sectors (Buffie, 1993, p. 664; Frank, 1969, pp. 168-169; Muller, 1979, pp. 159-160) .
With regard to the environment, critics of FDI argue that regulators in developing countries are reluctant to enforce environmental norms for fear of discouraging foreign investors (Salvatore, 1998, p. 175, 384; Thompson & Strohm, 1996, pp. 363-364) . This contention might be bolstered by a finding that foreign investors shy away from investing in countries that possess strong environmental regulatory institutions. With regard to CEE countries, the OECD (1999) found no evidence that foreign investors were discouraged by new, stricter environmental regulations (pp. 161-162). Rather, it determined that CEE governments that made meaningful environmental regulatory reforms in the 1990s enjoyed relatively large FDI inflows during that period.
Regardless of the alleged downsides of FDI, CEE governments are eager to lure FDI to allay domestic capital constraints, generate jobs, modernize industry, and give their countries access to international markets through MNCs' global trade networks. Through the mid-1990s, CEE political and economic elites were anxious about the sluggish pace of foreign investment inflows to the region. Between 1989 and 1995, total inflows of FDI to CEE (excluding FDI to the former East Germany) amounted to U.S. $43 billion. During that same period, Argentina and Mexico attracted more FDI in absolute terms-about U.S. $47 billionand 3 times as much in per capita terms (Sinn & Weichenrieder, 1997, pp. 180-181) . The pace of FDI to CEE increased precipitously in the midto late 1990s. Between 1995 and 1997, FDI to CEE more than doubled compared with the previous 3-year period (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 1998, p. 364) . From the perspective of CEE ministers of commerce, the main concern with FDI is assuring that these inputs will continue to grow. The excessive power of foreign investors and MNCs' preferences for capital-intensive production are secondary concerns. Attracting FDI, some observers contend, requires that CEE governments not only address investors' ordinary preinvestment jitters (including misgivings about corrupt business practices in the region, the transparency and predictability of tax and regulatory systems, and the quality and cost of labor) but also placate investors' concerns about environmental liability for past pollution (Boyd, 1996; Goldenman, 1999) .
Environmental Liability as an Impediment to FDI
In 1992, the World Bank surveyed 1,001 large North American and Western European mining, construction, and manufacturing companies that were prospective investors in CEE. Of the 255 firms that responded to the survey, all had considered, were considering, or already had made investments in Poland, Hungary, or the former Czechoslovakia (Klavens & Zamparutti, 1995, p. 3) . Most respondents indicated that environmental factors were not the most important variables bearing on their decisions to invest. But many asserted that environmental issues played a role in determining "how and where investment is made." Among perceived impediments to FDI, respondents ranked "environmental issues, e.g., liability issues" third out of a list of eight key concerns, indicating investors' relatively high level of anxiety about environmental risks.
Prospective investors and various experts continue to express concerns about environmental liability in CEE. Most frequently condemned are ambiguous environmental liability rules in CEE and the imprecision and transitive nature of environmental standards in these countries (Goldenman, 1999, pp. 76-77; S ! leszyn! ski, 1996, p. 12) . It has been suggested that CEE governments do not understand the gravity of the environmental liability problem and its role in discouraging FDI. Kolaja (1996) , for example, reports that in some CEE countries, privatization authorities are frustrated when prospective investors raise concerns about liability for old contamination (pp. 164-166).
In fact, over the past 10 years, CEE governments have developed rules and procedures to clarify new owners' liability for past pollution. CEE authorities' and foreign investors' experiences with new liability schemes have not been universally positive. Problems with liability schemes stem not only from CEE authorities' inexperience in administering the new rules and procedures but also from problems inherent to the liability alternatives themselves, namely, in the trade-offs that different liability schemes offer previous and current owners of contaminated properties. The next section presents key characteristics of prototypical liability rules and procedures available to CEE governments, trade-offs posed by these schemes, and CEE governments' experiences implementing these arrangements.
Alternative Environmental Liability Schemes
Typical environmental liability schemes in the United States and Western Europe impose either strict and retroactive cleanup obligations on current property owners or relieve current owners of some or all of these obligations, foisting liability on the previous owners or on the 10 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT state. Under strict and retroactive rules, current owners are liable for all remediation and compensation costs regardless of whether these owners are responsible for generating the environmental risks in question. Past pollution includes previously released on-site and off-site contamination and third party injuries that may be unknown or unknowable at the time of the property's sale to the current owner. Under nonretroactive liability arrangements, the previous owner or the state pays for remediation and other costs and claims associated with past pollution not caused by the current owner. Limited liability arrangements foist some but not all cleanup and compensation costs on current owners. Each of these arrangements is considered in greater detail below.
STRICT AND RETROACTIVE LIABILITY SCHEMES
Under strict and retroactive liability rules, buyers beware. When a property is purchased, the buyer assumes ownership over all assets and liabilities. For new owners of potentially contaminated properties in CEE, this is a particularly risky arrangement. Theoretically, prospective investors could identify past contamination problems by conducting an environmental audit of the sale property. This step allows investors to estimate costs for cleanup and compensation before the property is purchased. However, CEE privatization agencies often do not mandate environmental audits as a condition of property sale. There may be a provision whereby purchasers pay a small fee for a preliminary audit performed by the state or by contractors to the state, but these audits are relatively superficial, and there is substantial risk that the audits will fail to reveal all past contamination. In worst-case scenarios, cleanup costs for past pollution not detected in the preliminary audit could exceed the value of the purchased property itself.
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Strict and retroactive liability arrangements pose problems for governments that are eager to privatize polluted, state-owned properties while shifting environmental liability to new owners. Precisely because these rules expose new owners to liability for past pollution, investors are more likely to balk at opportunities to invest in such properties. The disincentives are magnified when cleanup costs erode a large portion of the enterprise's total value.
In CEE, domestic companies' limited access to affordable capital further dampens their willingness to assume liability for past contamination. Enterprises in many CEE countries, particularly in the southern tier, operate in economies with relatively high inflation rates, large spreads between deposit and lending rates, and short payback periods Auer et al. / ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 11 2. If purchasers in CEE were able to obtain environmental liability insurance, they could protect themselves against environmental audits that fail to detect past contamination. Thomas (1994, pp. 205-216) argues convincingly that in Poland, the most promising candidates to underwrite this type of insurance are bilateral and multilateral aid agencies.
for commercial bank loans. International portfolio investments add liquidity to capital markets in CEE, but overall liquidity remains relatively low compared with levels in most EU countries (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1999, pp. 134-141) . The relative scarcity of financing for capital investment in CEE reduces firms' preparedness to clean up environmental liabilities. From an enterprise's perspective, capital used to clean up environmental liabilities is capital diverted from other activities that may be more profitable in the short run.
In CEE, these problems are compounded by the impermanence of environmental rules and standards. Firms' willingness to invest in pollution abatement depends on their confidence in the implementation and enforceability of relevant environmental rules (Fiedor, 1992) . Efforts to nurture good environmental citizenship among firms are undermined when environmental rules and standards frequently change. For example, shortly after the first wave of privatizations in the Czech Republic, foreign and domestic investors discovered that they might be liable for past pollution on privatized properties even in instances when owners were previously issued exemptions against such liability (Lawson, 1994, p. 1) . Beginning in 1993, the Czech government began promising "second wave" investors that the latter were eligible for at least partial reimbursement of cleanup costs for past pollution (Lawson, 1994, p.1) .
LIMITED AND NONRETROACTIVE LIABILITY SCHEMES
In limited and nonretroactive liability schemes, duties to pay for the cleanup of past pollution and restitution for injured third parties rest partly or wholly with actors other than the current owner. Because these schemes reduce or completely eliminate investors' liability for past pollution, investors may be more willing to purchase properties with known or suspected contamination. Moreover, these arrangements reduce the risk that successor firms will become insolvent due to excessive cleanup and remuneration costs.
There are numerous potential downsides to limited and nonretroactive liability arrangements, especially for the seller. First, there is a risk that the seller may not possess the financial resources to redress liability for past pollution. Second, audits performed on contaminated properties may fail to turn up hazards that are identified later, saddling the previous owner with potentially costly cleanup responsibilities. Third, because the previous owner is partly or fully liable for past pollution, the current owner may be prone to misidentify current pollution, claiming that it is past pollution. Fourth, purchasers may be tempted to mismanage cleanup responsibilities in instances when someone other than the purchaser pays for cleanup. For example, if part of the purchase price of a property is set aside in escrow to use for cleanup of past pollution-a practice that is (or has been) condoned in some CEE countries-the purchaser may be tempted to deplete escrow funds as much as possible because, as Boyd (1993, p. 6) argues, these funds represent a form of costless pollution remediation financing, and any unused funds usually revert to the seller.
Many of these problems are germane to the CEE context, as evidenced by instances when CEE governments immunized foreign investors against liability for past contamination, with the state shouldering exorbitant remediation costs (Goldenman, 1999, p. 79) . For example, when Hungary sold the state-owned LEHEL refrigerator manufacturer to Electrolux of Sweden, the state agreed to subtract 2.4 billion forints from the property's purchase price to cover cleanup costs (Heti Vilaggazdasag, 1994, p. 79; Kindler, 1997) . But, removing on-site and off-site contaminated soil proved more expensive than anticipated. Electrolux participated in the cleanup, but its efforts were remunerated by the state. By the mid-1990s, remediation costs had already exceeded the proceeds from the original property sale. In another case, in the early 1990s, the former Czechoslovakian government indemnified a joint venture involving the Czech company Skoda and Germany's Volkswagen. Czech lawmakers protested that the indemnity exposed the Czech National Environment Fund to open-ended claims. Some politicians groused that an immunized Volkswagen would flout Czech environmental laws and regulations (Wassersug, 1994, p. 400) . After years of wrangling among lawmakers, national privatization and environmental authorities, and Skoda-Volkswagen, a new deal was authored: Skoda-Volkswagen received a more narrowly defined exemption from liability (CTK National News Wire, 1994).
ANALYSIS OF LIABILITY OPTIONS
Both retroactive and nonretroactive liability arrangements present trade-offs for CEE governments. Strict and retroactive liability is advantageous in that it forces investors to shoulder all cleanup costs and associated liabilities, relieving governments and taxpayers of these potentially costly burdens. However, these rules tend to discourage risk-averse investors with negative consequences for FDI and privatization. Also, enterprises with limited access to cheap capital are wary of rules that force them to assume cleanup liability and set aside resources to cover future claims instead of making productive investments. Nonretroactive liability schemes mitigate the problem of investor leeriness in CEE because the previous owner (often the state) assumes some or all of the liability for past pollution. This option is costly to taxpayers and may be economically and politically untenable for CEE govern- Auer et al. / ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 13 ments.
3 It also creates perverse incentives for current owners to mismanage environmental cleanup efforts and engage in other forms of "buyer moral hazard."
The governments of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Estonia have instituted schemes that combine elements of strict liability and also limited and nonretroactive liability regimes. Often, these hybrid arrangements are limited liability schemes accompanied by temporary indemnities and escrow funds. Ceilings on reimbursable expenses and time limits on escrow accounts were adopted in Poland and Hungary in the mid-1990s (Boyd, 1996, note 21; Csanádi & Bell, 1999, pp. 12-13 ).
Poland's experience deserves special attention because that country's current system for negotiating environmental liability problems during privatization transactions has earned praise from various observers (see, e.g., Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999, p. 162; S ! leszyn! ski, 1999, pp. 25-26) , and when implementing national environmental strategies, other CEE governments are known to seek counsel from Polish environmental authorities.
4 Also, on a per capita basis, Poland has invested more in environmental protection than many of its neighbors (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999, pp. 130-131) . Poland has made genuine progress in clarifying national environmental liability rules and procedures. Nevertheless, the Polish state retains ownership of thousands of contaminated industrial properties. Moreover, although there is no compelling evidence that FDI in Poland is retarded by investors' concerns about past environmental liability, indirect evidence suggests that investors may not fret about environmental liability precisely because they are not investing in enterprises that generated large amounts of past on-and off-site pollution. The latter trend should worry CEE governments because domestic public and private funds to clean up contaminated sites are scarce, and international financial institutions have not proven especially eager to underwrite the cleanup and reuse of these sites.
14 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT 3. Csanádi and Bell (1999) reach a different conclusion. They contend that privatization agencies in CEE countries may be unduly concerned about incurring major cleanup expenses when the state accepts partial liability for cleanup. Based on a study of 79 Hungarian privatization contracts containing limited and/or nonretroactive liability clauses, the authors found that in aggregate, only about 4% of funds (about 3.1 billion forints) earmarked for site cleanup were expended and that, in general, the Hungarian state's profits from property sales were seldom greatly eroded by cleanup costs.
4. For example, Bulgaria's Ministry of Environment and Water has consulted Poland's Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry about Polish methods for financing environmental investments (PAP Polish Press Agency, 1997). See also Regional Environmental Center (1994).
Environmental Liability Institutions in Poland
Uniform rules governing environmental liability, regularized procedures for environmental auditing, and owners' and operators' responsibilities for cleaning up contaminated properties are not clearly defined in Polish privatization, FDI, or environmental statutes (Kristiansen, 1996, pp. 638-639) . Nevertheless, in recent years, the Polish government has attempted to clarify foreign investors' liability for past pollution. In 1992, Poland's Ministry of Privatization; Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry; and the State Inspectorate for Environmental Protection established an Interministerial Environmental Unit (IEU) to negotiate environmental issues during privatization transactions. Compared with an earlier arrangement whereby liability issues were handled by the Ministry of Privatization and provincial environmental authorities, the IEU has received high marks for its ability to negotiate purchasers' and the state's responsibilities to clean up past contamination. The IEU is also credited with improving the Ministry of Privatization's capacity to account for environmental costs during privatization (Cole, 1998, p. 203; Kristiansen, 1996, p. 643; S ! leszyn! ski, 1999, p. 24, 34) .
When privatizing state-owned properties, the Polish government invites bids from a pool of potential applicants. The applicants receive information from the state about the property, including the results of an initial environmental audit performed on behalf of the Ministry of Privatization (Thomas, 1994, p. 173) . Prospective purchasers cover the costs of these audits, which are relatively inexpensive and cursory. Generally, auditors do not collect or analyze samples of water, air, or soil at properties that are candidates for privatization (Thomas, 1994, p. 174) . These superficial audits may fail to detect past contamination, a potentially costly problem for investors who are bound by retroactive liability arrangements. When bidding on a poorly audited property, investors may underestimate cleanup and compensation costs and offer a bid price that is too high; these investors are liable if past contamination or injuries to third parties from past contamination are discovered at a later date. Alternatively, because the extent of damages is not always clarified by preliminary audits, purchasers may be tempted to overestimate cleanup costs and offer bid prices that are too low. Hence, substandard environmental audits are problematic for Polish privatization authorities as well.
Prospective investors' plans for dealing with environmental liability are one among a half dozen conditions that the state considers in reviewing applicants' bids for state-owned property (Bell & Kolaja, 1993; S ! leszyn! ski, 1999, p. 30) . In practice, the most important factors in the government's appraisal of bids are the applicants' provisions for cash Auer et al. / ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 15 payments and plans for improving the property. Often, the state agrees a priori to assume some liability for past pollution. In this instance, prospective bidders who agree to shoulder some cleanup costs are more likely to be winning bidders, especially when multiple applicants' bid prices are equivalent (Bell & Kolaja, 1993) .
During the early 1990s, many owners of newly privatized properties in Poland were granted time-limited indemnities against third party, environment-related injury claims. The government agreed to assume responsibility if the injury took place when the facility was a stateowned enterprise (or, alternatively, if the injury was caused by recent exposure to past contamination generated by the state-owned enterprise). If third party claims were made after expiration of the indemnification period, the current owner was required to show that the contamination in question was generated by the state-owned enterprise (Bell & Kolaja, 1993, p. 954) .
Also, new investors were allowed to place a portion of the property's sale price into an escrow account. Funds in the account could be drawn on for approved environmental cleanup activities. After an allotted time, escrow accounts were closed, and unused funds reverted to the state (Bell & Kolaja, 1993, p. 954) . Generally, funds were used only for remediation of past pollution identified in the preliminary environmental audit or past pollution that was identified during the life of the escrow account. Use of escrow accounts for environmental remediation was largely abandoned in the late 1990s after the Polish Ministry of Finance raised questions about the government's rights to and discretion over expired escrow monies (S ! leszyn! ski, 1999, p. 23). In sum, during the 1990s, the Polish government endeavored to streamline and regularize the process of negotiating environmental liability during privatization transactions. The IEU, a special governmental unit created for this purpose, improved coordination between the Ministries of Privatization and Environmental Protection and simplified the negotiation process between investors and the state concerning cleanup duties and exposure to third party injury claims. It is probable that the IEU's granting of conditional indemnification and assent to the use of escrow funds for cleanup helped facilitate some privatization transactions. The IEU's flexible approach may have reassured some investors, including foreign investors, who were ambivalent about unclear rules governing liability for past contamination.
However, several problems impair this system's performance. First, environmental auditing of sale properties remains optional (Cole, 1998, pp. 202-203; S ! leszyn! ski, 1999, p. 28) . Depending on the liability scheme adopted by privatization authorities, failure of authorities and investors to uncover past contamination can impose costly cleanup and compensation obligations on new owners and/or the state. Risks to buyers and sellers remain even when audits are performed because these audits tend to be of low quality.
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Second, the IEU has authority to negotiate liability matters only for properties undergoing "capital privatization." The overwhelming majority of properties are privatized through liquidation, but liquidated assets are not subject to the IEU's environmental review. Hence, of the 4,500 state-owned properties that entered into privatization proceedings in the 1990s, the IEU negotiated liability matters for only 200 (S ! leszyn! ski, 1999, p. 64).
Third, the Polish government has documented slow progress in cleaning up past contamination at privatized sites. A 1996 evaluation by the Polish State Inspectorate for Environmental Protection found that of the 79 state-owned properties that were privatized through capital privatization (as opposed to liquidation followed by privatization), only 14 enterprises (18%) had achieved "substantial environmental improvement" (S ! leszyn! ski, 1999, pp. 30-31). Fourth, the Polish government's suspension of the use of escrow accounts does not encourage wary foreign investors to take chances on contaminated properties in CEE. Two types of foreign investors may be most troubled by the termination of the escrow account policy: those whose willingness to buy contaminated properties depends greatly on the availability of such accounts and those who consider the change in policy to be symptomatic of the impermanence of environmental norms in Poland.
Finally, and notwithstanding changes to the escrow account policy, it is not clear whether efforts to clarify rules and procedures for environmental liability have helped lure foreign investors to contaminated sites. Polish authorities have neither published nor otherwise made accessible data on FDI flows to privatized properties disaggregated by the properties' environmental status, for example, relative quantities of on-and/or off-site contamination at privatized properties. Although we could not isolate data on privatization of state-owned assets differentiated by these assets' environmental conditions, we examined FDI flows to industries that incur relatively high pollution abatement costs as a percentage of total costs. In industrialized countries, heavy and extractive industry sectors such as coal mining, steel, chemicals, pulp and paper, and cement manufacturing tend to incur high pollution abatement costs as a percentage of total costs (Leonard, 1988, pp. 88-91; Low & Yeats, 1992, p. 91) . In CEE, these "pollution-prone" industrial sectors generated significant quantities of on-and off-site pollution during the Communist era (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994, pp. 14-15). Mining Auer et al. / ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 17 5. To reduce uncertainty about the scope of past contamination, the purchaser could commission his or her own in-depth audit. But, as Thomas (1994, citing Nash) points out, privately sponsored audits tend to be expensive (p. 183).
and heavy industries are represented in abundance in a list of priority industrial "hot spots" identified for cleanup in a regional European environmental action program (the Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action Program).
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According to data published by the Polish Agency for Foreign Investment (PAIZ) (2000) , between January 1993 and December 1999, approximately 10% to 25% of the U.S. $30 billion of FDI flowing to Poland was invested in heavy and extractive industries. The high end of this interval undoubtedly exaggerates the magnitude of foreign investment in heavy and extractive industries, because PAIZ reports FDI data at the sectoral level but not at the subsectoral level. Hence, for some sectors, relatively dirty as well as relatively clean industries are sectoral constituents; for example, "pulp, paper, publishing, and printing" are members of a single industry sector, although pulp and paper industries tend to be more pollution prone than publishing and printing industries. Coarser data sets published by the UNCTAD (1998, p. 274, 1999, p. 435 ) and the OECD (1998a, p. 274) corroborate PAIZ's indicators of low to moderate levels of FDI in heavy and extractive industry sectors in Poland in the mid-to late 1990s. 7 Moreover, between 1993 and 1999, the percentage of total FDI flowing to pollution-prone industries such as pulp and paper, steel, and chemicals diminished (Figure 1) . 8 Hence, Poland's efforts in the early 1990s to clarify environmental liability rules and procedures are not associated with proportional increases in FDI flows to Poland's heavy and extractive industry sectors later in the decade.
To sum up, official Polish data reveal that during the 1990s, FDI flows to that nation's heavy and extractive industries were variable and, moreover, that most FDI went to relatively less pollution-prone economic sectors. These trends do not elucidate what role, if any, Poland's environmental liability reforms had in luring FDI to pollution-prone industries. However, over the course of the 1990s, there was no clear upward trend of FDI flows to heavy and extractive industries, and environment-18 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT 6. The Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action Program (JCP) was initiated by the 13 nations of the Baltic Sea drainage basin as well as the EU and five international financial institutions. Most of the 132 sites identified on the JCP hot spot list are in Poland, the Baltic states, and Russia. Five industrial sectors account for roughly three quarters of all CEE industries on the hot spot list: coal and other mineral mining, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, steel, pulp and paper, and chemicals (Helsinki Commission, 1992, pp. 3.1-3.27, 5.33-5.46).
7. Based on data from the UNCTAD, Hakogi and McMillan (2000, p. 3) reach a similar conclusion regarding FDI flows to pollution-prone industries in the CEE region as a whole: They find relatively little FDI directed to heavy industries in CEE between 1989 and 1998. 8. Because PAIZ and other official data sources do not disaggregate FDI inflows by subsector or industry, we used PAIZ's data from the following sectors as proxies for pollution-prone industries in Poland: pulp and paper, publishing, and printing; chemicals and chemical products; rubber and plastics; metals and metal products; other nonmetallic mineral products; leather and leather products; electricity generation and gas and water supply; and quarrying and mining. related legal and procedural reforms in the early 1990s are not positively correlated with proportional increases in FDI flows to pollution-prone industries later in the decade.
Undoubtedly, other factors besides environmental liability may also explain low investment flows to pollution-prone industries in CEE, including, among other things, barriers to foreign entry, concerns about the age of capital stock, overproduction and excess inventories, competition from regional producers, and transaction costs associated with corporate restructurings.
9 Because other factors influence investors' willingness to buy environmentally suspect industries in CEE, efforts to increase FDI flows to these industries must address multiple concerns, not just environmental liability. We do not intend to offer a comprehensive prescription to resolve all of these disparate concerns, but we propose that in contexts where prospective purchases involve old, industrial assets in CEE, stakeholders can gain by considering the applicability and adaptability of Western-style brownfields revitalization 9. There are a variety of other economic and political concerns that investors must confront before investing in CEE, but these concerns pertain to investment in the region generally and not to investment in pollution-prone industries specifically. Relevant concerns include but are not confined to political stability of the host government, security of property rights, rules governing taxation and repatriation of profits, quality of labor, quality of transportation and communication infrastructure, and proximity to markets. policies and programs. Brownfields revitalization addresses environmental liability as part of the larger problem of transferring, cleaning up, and reusing old, contaminated industrial sites.
Brownfields as a Social Concern
Many contaminated industrial properties in CEE reside in areas where unemployment rates are higher than the national average, investments in new commercial and industrial infrastructure are trifling, and capital financing is scarce. Especially for those CEE municipalities that share space with orphaned or partly operating factories (e.g., Upper Silesia, Poland, and Borsod County, Czech Republic), the problem context resembles that of municipalities in the industrial heartland of northern England, the Ruhr valley of Germany, and urban areas in the eastern and Great Lakes regions of the United States, where local officials seek to revitalize old, contaminated lands and industrial assets.
As in CEE countries, derelict factories in Western European and American towns and cities are frequently contaminated and are studiously avoided by investors. Failure to redress past industrial contamination may pose serious risks to nearby inhabitants, as illustrated by notorious public health catastrophes in towns such as Love Canal, New York, and Lekkerkerk, the Netherlands.
10 But, the social costs of failing to clean up and reuse old, industrial lands and waste sites extend beyond costs to public health.
In the United States, England, continental Europe, and the former Soviet Union, the presence of old, contaminated factories-some partly operating, some abandoned-obstructs more productive uses of capital and land where these facilities reside and tends to diminish the economic potential of the neighborhoods and communities that surround the factories. Social costs associated with contaminated lands and buildings are not confined to the physical spaces and neighborhoods where these assets reside. Urban residents living near but not in blighted areas incur economic losses because adjacent brownfields are underutilized and avoided by investors. Residents in relatively pristine areas are affected by sprawl and increased pollution as investors in brick-andmortar projects shun industrialized areas, opting for greenfields. With greenfield sprawl, business-to-business and business-to-home 20 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT 10. At Lekkerkerk, hundreds (and at Love Canal, thousands) of homes were evacuated and abandoned after industrial toxins were discovered in nearby ground water, surface water, and soil. At Love Canal, contamination was caused by solvents and other chemicals leaking from a poorly secured, privately owned waste dump. Homes in Lekkerkerk were built on reclaimed land where 1,600 drums of chemicals were illegally disposed. (Regarding the latter case, see "Dutch Seek Cleanup," 1980, p. A14.) transportation costs and travel times increase. Advocates for open space, prime farm land, and green corridors lose out as industries relocate or new factories are built in undeveloped areas (Meyer, Williams, & Yount, 1995, pp. 17-18) . Hence, a broad cross-section of society, both within and outside old, industrial neighborhoods, incurs costs from public neglect of brownfields and from private actors' avoidance of the real and perceived environmental liabilities these sites harbor.
Lessons From Brownfields Revitalization in Western Europe
Years of economic stagnation in blighted, urban, industrial areas and the problem of greenfield sprawl have inspired European and U.S. governments to develop and deploy new remedies for brownfields cleanup and revitalization. For CEE countries with similar problems, the recent brownfields revitalization experience in post-Cold War Germany would seem to offer a promising model for study and imitation. Environmental problems in the former East Germany, including former East German industries' reliance on heavily polluting lignite and the presence of dilapidated, partly operating, and abandoned industrial sites, resemble those in neighboring countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. However, the substance of recent policy reforms in Germany diverges from that of its CEE neighbors in two important ways, namely the German government's willingness to indemnify past polluters and the broad scope of the government's participation in cleanup. Under the Environmental Liability Act of 1990, investors, including foreign investors in former East German properties were exempted from liability for damages caused by pollution emitted before July 1, 1990 (Meyer et al., 1995, pp. 138-141; Thomas, 1994, pp. 195, 197-198) .
11 The German government's participation in cleaning up this old contamination is substantial. For example, in the Ruhrgebiet in Nordhrein-Westfalen, a heavily industrialized region where more than two thirds of Germany's derelict lands and abandoned factories reside, public-private partnership agencies administer ambitious redevelopment programs, with the public sector taking the lead role in cleanup and new owners receiving amnesty from cleanup and compensation duties (Meyer et al., 1995, p. 139 ). An official with Germany's Federal Environmental Agency declares that Germany's 1995 Federal Law on Soil Protection embraces the principle of "polluter pays" but that "in most cases, the public authorities have to take on the cleanup costs" Auer et al. / ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 21 11. For various exceptions to current owners' exemptions from liability for past pollution in the former East Germany, see Thomas (1994, pp. 197-198) . (Franzius, 1995, p. 506; see also S ! leszyn! ski, 1999, p. 40) . From 1995 to 2005, Germany will spend almost 44 billion deutsche marks to remedy and recycle contaminated lands in the former East Germany (Franzius, 1995, p. 507 ).
Germany's relatively investor-friendly strictures governing liability for past pollution and the state's high level of public sector involvement in site restoration are the norm for wealthy members of the EU. In the 1990s, Danish courts determined that strict environmental liability rules were effectively unenforceable under Danish civil law (Skovgaard, 1995, p. 509) . In several cases, the Danish Supreme Court determined that alleged polluters were not liable for past pollution because it could not be proven that the accused were acting with bad faith at the time the polluting activity took place (Skovgaard, 1995, p. 509) . In these instances and others, the Danish government eventually underwrote remedial costs at the contaminated sites. Regarding orphaned sites and other contaminated industrial properties, Skovgaard (1995) , of the Danish Environmental Protection Agency, writes, "In reality there have been very few cases where the polluter responsible pays for site investigations and remedial activities" (p. 509). Meanwhile, owners and leaseholders who are not suspected of generating the contamination in question are often immunized against cleanup and third party claims.
In Austria, public funds are essential for remediating brownfields. Environmental authorities in Austria may compel "potentially responsible parties" (PRPs) to take immediate action to clean up contaminated sites, but according to the Federal Ministry of Environment in Vienna, the public share of cleanup funds is generally approximately 60% to 90%, even in instances when PRPs are enjoined to participate in cleanup (Kasamas, 1995, p. 513) .
Holding constant the matter of how to finance cleanup and compensation, Western European governments' investor-friendly liability assignments could be adapted to the CEE brownfields context. By indemnifying current owners against liability for past pollution, CEE governments can accelerate the transfer of state properties to private investors and quicken flows of FDI to contaminated sites. But, CEE countries lack the human and financial resources to administer cleanup programs comparable in scope to the German public-private revitalization scheme (S ! leszyn! ski, 1999, pp. 20-21, 28) , nor can CEE governments institute the types of generous amnesty arrangements common in Denmark and Austria. Moreover, to the extent that CEE governments do sponsor efforts to protect air, water, and soil, it is largely to prevent future pollution rather than clean up past pollution. This preference is justified not only by the logic of "pollution prevention pays" but by a European Commission that insists that candidates for EU membership accelerate spending on pollution prevention specifically (Commission for the European Communities, 2000). Internal and external pressures to question. CERCLA has been widely criticized because of the slow pace of cleanup at sites listed on CERCLA's National Priority List and due to the costly litigation that accompanies many of these cleanup efforts (see, e.g., Hird, 1994) . Partly out of frustration with CERCLA and SARA, federal, state, and municipal governments are developing and administering brownfields revitalization programs to expedite the transfer, cleanup, and reuse of contaminated sites. Some aspects of these programs may be adaptable to the CEE context, including granting conditional indemnification to current owners as well as various tax incentive programs.
In 1995, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated the Brownfields Action Agenda. This program partly suspends CERCLA's strict, retroactive, and joint and several liability strictures as long as new owners and operators of contaminated properties comply with certain conditions. These conditions include the owners' consent to EPA enforcement authority over the site, assurances that the owners' activities will neither interfere with ongoing cleanup actions at the site nor pose health risks to the surrounding community, and assurances that owners are financially solvent (Walsh, 1997, p. 206) . The new program shields qualified owners from liability for past pollution. In addition, it creates more flexible cleanup standards by limiting future uses of contaminated properties for commercial or industrial purposes. Both of these provisions are adaptable to the CEE context. In fact, on a case-bycase basis, the governments of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Estonia already release new owners and operators from liability for past pollution. CEE governments could adopt the second provisionforcing new owners to clean up sites, but only to levels acceptable for commercial or industrial uses-and avoid the excesses of CERCLA, which requires remediation to precontamination levels. However, when owners are allowed to clean up sites to less than pristine levels, governments are obliged to give citizens unfettered access to information about on-and off-site contamination and institute and promote other right-to-know and petitionary arrangements.
In CEE countries, there is a risk that even if redevelopment plans pass the legal tests for openness and fairness, privatization and industrial interests will prevail over relatively weak community-based and environmental interests. This risk may be diminishing in Poland, where in recent years, public participation has become more common in court hearings and in the environmental deliberations that accompany privatization transactions (Radojeva, 1996, p. 91) . 12 The same cannot be said of Bulgaria, where citizens' access to environmental information is limited.
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12. For an opposing view, see Brown, Angel, and Derr (1998, p. 36) , who document diminished environmental activism among labor unions, nongovernmental organizations, and the general public in post-Communist Poland.
Moreover, about 90% of regulated businesses and industries in Bulgaria are state owned, and environmentalists question the state's willingness to enforce environmental laws and regulations (Smeelink, 1995 (Smeelink, -1996 . Even in the Czech Republic, with its relatively well-developed democratic institutions, observers fret about the government's tendency to sequester environmental information and about citizens' reluctance to participate in environmental policy institutions (Fagin & Jehlicka, 1998, pp. 119-121) .
In addition to indemnifying current owners against liability for past pollution, linking the level of cleanup to future uses of remediated lands, and ensuring citizens' right to know about the cleanup and reuse of contaminated properties, brownfields restoration programs in the United States are making increased use of tax incentives to lure investors to old, industrial sites. For example, in Akron, Ohio, and Minneapolis, Minnesota, municipal governments raised several million dollars to clean up brownfields by instituting tax increment financing measures (Iannone, 1996, p. 45) . In Michigan, purchasers of contaminated properties have received state and local tax credits for cleaning up old, industrial sites (Hula, 1999, p. 13) . These incentives offer practical examples for CEE, particularly as tax assessment and collection systems in CEE become more efficient and as local, regional, and national authorities begin to use taxes not merely to raise revenue but to modify taxpayers' environmental behavior.
In the United States, federal grants and loans for brownfields revitalization are transferred to local governments. For example, the EPA planned to set aside U.S. $100 million to subsidize various state-and municipal-level brownfields renewal efforts in 1998 (Bartsch, 1997, p. 36) . In fact, Poland sponsors comparable levels of environmental largesse. Its National Fund for Environmental Protection, in conjunction with various provincial and municipal environmental funds, contributed about U.S. $383 million to environmental investments in 1993 (S ! leszyn! ski, 1996, pp. 6-7) . However, these funds underwrite a variety of environmental investments, including not only the cleanup of past pollution but also pollution prevention and clean production projects and municipal environmental infrastructure projects. Redistributing the proceeds of environmental funds to favor the cleanup of past pollution at the expense of preventing future pollution will not pass muster in Poland nor would it be popular with the European Commission. Already, more applications for pollution prevention projects are rejected by Poland's National Fund for Environmental Protection than are awarded. Moreover, Poland's national fund is large compared with the environmental funds of other transitional economies.
Poland and other CEE countries could reproduce some of the legal and tax reform innovations of U.S. brownfields revitalization programs. But, the U.S. model of generous intergovernmental resource transfers for brownfields revitalization is unrealistic even for the relatively wealthy CEE countries. The U.S. model is unworkable in CEE in at least one other respect. In many instances, brownfields redevelopment in the United States moves private properties into public hands. CEE governments mostly strive to transform public properties into private assets, not vice versa.
Leveraging Foreign Direct Investment for Brownfields Revitalization
Where domestic capital is scarce, brownfields revitalization programs in CEE countries must move some state-owned properties into the hands of foreign investors or joint venture partners. The OECD (1999, p. 132) reports that domestic environmental financing in CEE from national and subnational environmental funds peaked for most CEE countries in the mid-1990s. For example, in the Czech Republic, between 1992 and 1997, central government budget transfers (including outlays from environmental funds and publicly sponsored grants and loans) declined from 44% to 14% of the share of total investment in that nation's pollution abatement and cleanup efforts (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999, p. 132). Private investment flows from abroad are increasingly important sources of financing for environmental protection in CEE, as are funds from EU institutions for CEE countries seeking accession to the EU (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999, pp. 136-137) . However, indirect evidence suggests that the bulk of foreign private investment and foreign aid for environmental protection is directed to pollution prevention activities rather than cleanup of past pollution. For example, the OECD (1999, pp. 162-176) reports that in the manufacturing sector in CEE, most environment-related FDI focuses on efficient uses of energy, pollution prevention, and clean production. If this is the case, then governments who attended the 1993 Lucerne Environment for Europe Conference are realizing a central objective of that meeting, namely, to encourage domestic and foreign stakeholders to invest primarily in activities that prevent pollution rather than cure pollution (Environment for Europe, 1993, p. II.25).
As we have stated elsewhere in this article, the bias toward public and private investment in pollution prevention rather than cleanup of past pollution in CEE is justifiable. But, as long as domestic resources for environmental protection are scarce in CEE-and in the absence of substantial environmental funding from external actors-continued neglect of old, contaminated properties is the inevitable consequence of policies that favor prevention and/or treatment of prospective pollution.
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CEE governments need not feel compelled to choose between sponsoring exorbitant, Western-style brownfields revitalization programs or relegating brownfields to the bottom of the environmental priority list. Instead, they can and should induce larger FDI flows to brownfields through combinations of practicable legal and economic incentives. These incentives include offering tax credits to investors who agree to locate or relocate to brownfields and, in some instances, imposing higher property taxes on those who invest in greenfield sites. Also, governments could lift import duties on devices that isolate, contain, and/or treat past pollution. Also, tax authorities could permit rapid asset depreciation for these devices to lower the tax burden on enterprises that clean up past pollution.
There are more indirect approaches to appeal to foreign investors' profit motives and to increase their willingness to participate in the cleanup and reuse of brownfields. CEE governments could publicly recognize enterprises that are successful at cleaning up past pollution. Cash awards are not necessary; firms may be able to parlay nonmonetary recognition into higher earnings as they entice environmentally conscious consumers. CEE governments could also sponsor modest amounts of research and development (R&D) funds for industries that pledge to develop technologies and methods to remediate past pollution. Alternatively, the state's grant may leverage or match environmental R&D commitments that other grantors pledge.
Continued Importance of Multilateral and Bilateral Aid
If CEE governments were more adroit at channeling international public resources to brownfields, it is conceivable that foreign private investors would follow suit. Credit from multilateral and bilateral aid agencies can leverage FDI in cleaning up past pollution. To illustrate, the remediation and modernization of two of Estonia's largest air pollution emission sources (a pulp and paper mill in Kehra and a cement factory in Kunda) were made possible by foreign companies whose investments were leveraged by loans from the World Bank and the Nordic Investment Bank (Auer & Raukas, 2000) .
In addition to leveraging private money with loans and grants from international financial institutions and bilateral aid agencies, CEE countries can lure private investors by partnering them with domestic investors who are beneficiaries of debt-for-environment swaps. In 1991, half of Poland's U.S. $45 billion in Paris Club and London Club debt was rescheduled, and creditor countries agreed that up to 10% of Poland's debt would be forgiven if Poland allocated these monies to environmental protection. Total resources made available to Poland through Auer et al. / ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 27 debt-for-environment swaps may amount to U.S. $400 million per year by 2010 (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995, p. 151) . Over its 8-year existence, Poland's EcoFund, the domestic facility that approves and disburses environmental project funds from Poland's swapped debt, has authorized funding for more than 150 clean air and water, climate change, and biodiversity activities (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring Economies, 1998, p. 4) . Only in the late 1990s did EcoFund add contaminated soil to a list of priority project areas. Although EcoFund grants tend to be small, projects sponsored by the fund have yielded impressive results, especially those dealing with air pollution.
13 Auditors praise EcoFund for "closing deals" by helping lure private investors who otherwise might reject participation in environmental projects. Also, EcoFund is credited with helping transfer environmental technologies to Poland (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring Economies, 1998, pp. 5, 16) . Notwithstanding these accomplishments, EcoFund has had only a limited impact on the remediation of sites harboring past contamination. With the recent addition of contaminated soil to the list of EcoFund priorities, this trend may change.
Debt-for-environment mechanisms could be adapted to other CEE country contexts. Indeed, the Polish experience inspired Bulgaria and its Swiss creditors to negotiate a comparable debt-for-environment swap in 1996 (Kolk & van der Weij, 1998, p. 59 ). However, a key challenge for CEE countries is identifying creditors who are willing to write off debt for environmental protection. For example, the World Bank is reluctant to break with conventions requiring debtors to repay loans on time and in full. To date, only commercial banks and governments have participated in debt-for-environment swaps, and these actors are aware of the pitfalls, including high transaction costs in designing and implementing swaps and institutional capacity constraints in debtor countries. There are also problems with the debt instruments themselves. In some countries, sovereign and commercial bank debt has been exchanged for interest-bearing bonds, which are used to finance environmental investments in the host country. This arrangement is risky because high inflation can erode the value of bond interest and principal payments 28 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT 13. For example, between 1992 and 1996, EcoFund-supported projects helped Poland reduce its emissions of chlorofluorocarbons 11 and 12 by more than one quarter and its dust emissions by more than 13% (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring Economies, 1998, p. 15) . These are impressive results considering that during those years, EcoFund approved less than U.S. $70 million for air pollution projects (and it disbursed an even smaller amount) (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring Economies, 1998, p. 4). revitalization successful and to attract FDI for environmental cleanup. But, Poland's success depends on the abiding interests of creditor nations and multilateral financial institutions. Creditor nations can leverage FDI flows to Poland and other CEE countries by expanding debt-for-environment swaps that focus on past pollution cleanup. When private investors hesitate to participate in cleanup, international financial institutions can help close deals by issuing loans for and taking equity stakes in promising brownfields revitalization projects.
CEE countries' success in attracting FDI is vital to any prospective brownfields revitalization program, because for the foreseeable future, most domestic public resources for environmental protection will be directed to problems other than the cleanup of past pollution and the reuse of contaminated lands. Public investments that favor the prevention of future pollution over the cleanup of past pollution are warranted. But, in the meantime and in the absence of FDI, past pollution will continue to pose risks to public health, promote sprawl and environmental degradation in more pristine areas, and extend hard times in blighted, industrial neighborhoods in CEE towns and cities.
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